

Please note that I am not speaking for DHS, any past or present DHS organization, or any past or present DHS colleagues.

In addition to the *What's missing?* attachment, I've included the pandemic model table referenced in notes 40 and 42 (I've included the Resource for Planners version [p. 184] because the TA version has a typo), and page 15 (Bates number 000064) of the November 2015 White House-edited version of the SNRA Findings referenced in note 17 below, the October 16 letter to committee staff (p. 4) and the March 2019 SNRA FAQ (p. 7, first two sections).

I've tried to keep the amount of internal information that I'm communicating to the minimum needed for you to 1) understand what you're looking at, 2) substantiate the most important claims that I'm making that you can't otherwise corroborate; 3) have a meaningful conversation about it with one or more of the people who have the *ordinary* legal authority to share and discuss this information, that I can legally do only by exception (5 U.S.C. § 2302); and 4) be aware of the techniques (pp. 15-16 below) that DHS uses to deflect scrutiny from these contradictions, which have been hiding in plain view for ten years.

These aren't the Pentagon Papers.¹ This material – the unclassified base risk assessment I'm writing about – is 100% unclassified, with no security sensitivities whatsoever. We made it that way. Because the classification of the first (2011) edition had made it not useful for FEMA's state and local stakeholders, we intentionally removed every piece of information in the 2015 unclassified revision that could pose any obstacle to sharing with whole community partners. So information sensitivities also pose no obstacle for the hundreds of people in two branches of government who have access to this fully unclassified information right now, and the ordinary authority to discuss it with you that I don't have.

There are many internal routes for solving this problem: I have tried many of them. The main reason why they have failed is me: my own personal inability to clearly and coherently communicate how the deliberate burial of this science is illegal, wrong, and dangerous. That's why all those internal routes by which the system should have fixed itself long ago, haven't worked: I can't communicate what the deciders in them need to know, clearly and coherently. You don't have that problem.

There are a lot of things that won't make sense. For many of them, that is because they really don't make sense: they shouldn't exist in the first place. But for many, maybe most, of the others, it is because I don't know how to explain them clearly. I apologize: I've done the best I could.

FEMA

Unfortunately, the DHS/FEMA that I have to describe below, in some places, may sound like a different organization than the FEMA you know – the confident, resourceful, dedicated, noble, brave, patriotic, and in every way admirable and honorable agency that beat back the coronavirus apocalypse in this country, and saved thousands of lives. That is the real FEMA. The shadow that I have to call by that name in some parts here is an aberration, and a small one. The FEMA that you see every day is the real FEMA, not the one described below.

The unredacted information that these letters, attachments, and links communicate is explicitly within the scope of 5 U.S.C. § 2302, and communicated solely for its lawful purposes.

-- Andrew Janca, 7/4/2021

¹ There is a parallel classified product that is very important, but it has been completely separated from this unclassified version since 2015.

Summary

The DHS/FEMA Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA)¹³ is the science-based comparative national risk assessment of natural, accidental, and adversarial hazards that FEMA's National Preparedness System is based on.^{14,15} It has been locked up since 2011.¹⁶ ~~(The SNRA's climate change analysis is the only Government climate study that I know of that has been suppressed by both parties.^{17,18})~~ While classification and disagreements with DHS HQ had a lot to do with that before 2015,¹⁹ neither has been an obstacle since.²⁰

Moved to footnote

As far as I know, the decisions to suppress the science that FEMA's plans,²¹ requirements,²² and doctrine²³ are based on have been made by DHS/FEMA itself since 2015. ~~FEMA's current (7/4/2021²⁴) public explanation for why it doesn't want the risk assessment that it cites as its authority for so many things to be seen is that it might confuse the public,²⁵ or other Federal agencies;²⁶ and that it might cause the public to take protective actions against risks like pandemics,²⁷ wildfires,²⁸ space weather,²⁹ or climate change³⁰ that FEMA's leaders may have thought were important or real in 2015, but no longer do today.^{31,32}~~

¹³ Brief description, p. 14.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2011, September). National preparedness goal, 1st edition, pp. 3-4. At <https://www.fema.gov/pdf/prepared/npg.pdf>.

¹⁵ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2015, September 30). National preparedness goal, 2nd edition, pp. 4-5. At https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/national_preparedness_goal_2nd_edition.pdf.

¹⁶ March 2019 SNRA FAQ for Congress p. 1 (*General*); SNRA FOIA appeal (2018).pdf, pdf pp. 1-4 (unnumbered two pages of 9/24/2018 appeal and numbered pp. 1-2 of 11/1/2017 appeal letter). Attached, or at <https://bd02.github.io/external/Reorganized/Sent%20to%20committees%20March%202019/>.

¹⁷ White House edits to SNRA climate change findings p. 15, November 2015 Findings document (redacted content, Bates page number 000064 production *PEER v. DHS* at <https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6284501/24/3/public-employees-for-environmental-responsibility-v-united-states/>); outcome, FEMA/NPD SNRA decision briefing 30 November 2016.

¹⁸ Redacted content, Bates numbers 000072, 90-92, 322-338, production *PEER v. DHS* at <https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6284501/24/3/public-employees-for-environmental-responsibility-v-united-states/>.

¹⁹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2011, December 9). SNRA public summary, p. 4. At <https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-strategic-national-risk-assessment-ppd8.pdf>.

²⁰ March 2019 SNRA FAQ for Congress p. 2 (*Security*); SNRA FOIA appeal (2018).pdf, last page (page 2 of October 2016 FOIA request letter 2017-FEFO-00165). Attached, or at <https://bd02.github.io/external/Reorganized/Sent%20to%20committees%20March%202019/>. Since 2015, the classified SNRA (which includes the CBRN risk numbers) has been completely separated from the main unclassified base assessment. Unless noted otherwise, the unclassified 2015-present DHS/FEMA SNRA is the risk assessment that I refer to below.

²¹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2016, August 18). Protection Federal Interagency Operational Plan (FIOP) 1st edition (2016), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_protection-fiop.pdf pp. 5-6. Mitigation FIOP 2nd ed. (2016), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_mitigation-fiop.pdf pp. 5-6. Response FIOP 2nd ed. (2016), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_response-fiop.pdf pp. 7-8, B-3, B-4, B-9, B-1.1-1.4. Recovery FIOP 2nd ed. (2016), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_recovery-fiop.pdf p. 5.

²² U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2021, February 25). Risk-based core capabilities, pp. 9, 24, 33-34, A-1-2, 13-14, 17-18, 20-22, 26-29, 31, 47, B-1-3, 11-12, C-3, 5, D-13, E-8-9, F-12, G-16, H-1-2, 9, 12-13, 24-28. Preparedness grants manual. At https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FEMA_2021-Preparedness-Grants-Manual_02-19-2021.pdf. Core Capabilities, note 15 above.

²³ Note 15.

²⁴ ~~Declarations cited below, current status in docket at <https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6284501/public-employees-for-environmental-responsibility-v-united-states/>.~~

²⁵ DHS/FEMA National Preparedness Directorate (NPD) (2019, April 30). Paragraphs 10, 14, 16, 17. Declaration 28-1, *Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER) v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security* 1:2018-cv-00158, D.D.C., at <https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6284501/28/1/public-employees-for-environmental-responsibility-v-united-states/>.

²⁶ NPD (4/30/2019) declaration 28-1, paragraphs 10, 14, 16, 17.

²⁷ Disclosure Branch, FEMA (2019, March 1). Declaration 22-1, *PEER v. DHS* 1:2018-cv-00158, D.D.C.: at <https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6284501/22/1/public-employees-for-environmental-responsibility-v-united-states/>. Pages 3 (paragraph 12), 16 [Bates number 000076], 18 [109], 20 [128-132], 28-29 [260-275], 37 [370-372], 38 [388-391], 43 [481-483], 48 [552].

²⁸ Disclosure Branch (2019) pp. 5 (paragraph 12), 16 [Bates 000076], 20 [138-139], 38 [385-386], 44 [495-496], 51-53 [594-597, 604-607].

²⁹ Disclosure Branch (2019) pp. 5 (paragraph 12), 16 [Bates 000076], 20 [128, 130, 135-136], 22-23 [164-187], 37 [369], 38 [387-388], 44 [488-489], 48 [552].


³⁰ Disclosure Branch (2019) pp. 5 (paragraph 12), 16 [Bates 000072], 18 [90-92], 33-35 [322-338].

³¹ Disclosure Branch (2019) paragraph 11, p. 5.

³² NPD (2019) paragraphs 10, 14, 16, 17. The declarations in this case are the only public place I know of where FEMA has been forced to directly answer the question "Why don't you want anyone to see this?"

Corrected error below


Strategic National Risk Assessment 2015



Not depicted: Events with classified data (CBRN terrorist attacks), risks with data gaps or data comparability challenges (cyber attacks, cross-cutting events, qualitatively assessed events), acts of war, risks outside FEMA's traditional mission space.

HOMELAND SECURITY NATIONAL RISK CHARACTERIZATION 2018

HSNRC 2018 source data on DHS planets chart (displayed risks are primarily in FEMA's mission space)



Unlike the other three, this chart does **NOT** itself come from the 2018 HSNRC (at least not in any decks or documents that I have seen), but represents HSNRC 2018 data in the same format as the other assessments for purposes of comparison. Sets of uniformly sized circles represent the geometric midpoints of reported common order of magnitude bins, and the other circles depict the underlying data from the documentation and its cited public or SNRA sources. Not depicted: events with classified data (CBRN), unknown shareability (counterfeit goods), data gaps or limitations (cyber events, illegal migration, trans-national drug trafficking), acts of war. Plant disease depicted as same magnitude as animal disease. Deaths from illicit drug use are not depicted, but that is because of counting differences between the 2013 and 2018 assessments rather than [my] deliberate omission.